How did the Russian army won the battle for the Kursk region? And why did this operation need an Armed Forces? Summing up the main episode of the war in 2025 – Meduza

Kursk battle of seven months ends with the defeat of the Armed Forces. As often happened in the last two years of the war, the Ukrainian troops have gone under the threat of the environment – it seems, later than it should.

They had to leave part of the equipment, many military were killed or captured. However, the main forces of the Armed Forces of Ukraine were able to avoid the environment. From a political point of view, the invasion of the Kursk region did not bring any advantages to Ukraine: President Vladimir Zelensky repeatedly stated that the purpose of the occupation of part of the region was its subsequent exchange for Ukrainian territory. Now Kyiv has nothing to change. From a military point of view, evaluating the results of the battle is more difficult. The Armed Forces of Ukraine fettered large Russian forces from their bridgehead. But they themselves involved the most combat -ready brigades near Suda. And these forces could be used more efficiently if they left the bridgehead immediately after the start of the Russian counterattack in the Kursk region in the fall of 2024. How did Russia have a decisive offensive? And what is happening in the Kursk region now? On March 8, the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation began the next stage in the attack on the Ukrainian bridgehead. This stage was well prepared: on the eve of the Russian troops occupied the villages of Sverdlikovo and Lebedevka in the east of the bridgehead, and also crossed the border of the Sumy region south of Sverdlikovo. So they came close to the main supply of the Armed Forces of the Armed Forces – the Sudzha -Suma road – and physically cut another line that went north through Sverdlikovo. In the last week, before the decisive Russian blow, the Ukrainian military complained about the almost complete stop of the supply of the bridgehead due to round-the-clock attacks of Russian drones on the road of Suzha-Suma. Another supply path to the south of Sudzhi was also physically cut by the RF Armed Forces. On the first day of the offensive, the Russian units struck the north of Sudzhi, actually cutting off the entire north of the bridgehead from the city. It was there – between the roads of Sudzha -Kursk and Sudzha – Ligs – the advanced units of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation came out of the gas pipe. The blows “on the ground” were also aimed there. In the evening of March 8, the APU lost the most important fortified areas north of Sudzhi – in Malaya Lokne and Martynovka. March 9 is another in the Cossack elbow. It was during the spontaneous retreat from the northern part of the bridgehead of the Armed Forces of the Armed Forces of Ukraine that heavy losses were incurred. At the same time, the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation began an offensive to the eastern regions of Sudzhi. The Armed Forces of Ukraine could not organize their defense due to the fact that Russian aviation destroyed bridges across the Suda River, dividing the city into the western and eastern units. Nakonets, the RF Armed Forces entered the Center of Sudzhi. There were almost no rifle fights there: the Ukrainian units retreated to the border. The Russian Federations continue to advance to the control and access point of the Sudzha on the border, as well as south of Sudzhi near the village of Guyevo of the Kursk region. Probably, the remains of the bridgehead will be lost to the Armed Forces of Ukraine in the coming days, and the battles will move to the territory of the Sumy region. The RF Armed Forces already have a bridgehead there: to the east of the road from Suzha -Suma, they will storm the village of Basovka. Okolo Sudzhi can still remain individual groups of the Ukrainian military. So, the fate of Zaleshenka is not clear-the northwestern suburbs of Sudzhi. This area became famous in August 2024 at the beginning of the Ukrainian invasion of the Kursk region: it was there that the Pyaterochka store is located, against which many military Ukrainian Armed Forces were photographed. On March 13, the unofficial telegram channel of the Russian group “North” (including in the Kursk region) reported on March 13. However, the video with the liberated “five” did not appear. It is only known that the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation entered Zaleshenka on March 13. But in any case, in the Sudzhi area there are no thousands of surrounded Ukrainian military, as it was (probably from the words of Vladimir Putin), the US President Donald Trump tried to present. Why did the Armed Forces need a Kursk operation? What are its goals to achieve? Back in 2022, a strange situation developed at the front: it was clearly divided into two almost equal in length of the part: active-from the north-east of the Kharkov region to the mouth of the Dnieper, where most of the troops and both armies exchanged offensive and blows; passive-from the joint of Ukraine, Belarus and Poland to Kharkov to Kharkov to Kharkov along The Belarusian-Ukrainian and Russian-Ukrainian borders. The parties arranged raids across the border: the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation-by the forces of the GRU special forces groups, the Armed Forces of Ukraine-larger detachments subordinate to the main intelligence department. The latter even managed to capture settlements near the border – but only in order to quickly retreat to the territory of Ukraine. The first idea that the poorly covered sections of the “passive front” can be used to strike large forces to greater depths. In early May 2024, it organized an operation north of Kharkov. The border crossed the forces (tens of thousands of military personnel) of the Northern Military District, replenished with newly formed formations. They managed to advance several kilometers deep into the territory of Ukraine and take part of the city of Volchansk. The offensive was stopped by the reserve of the Armed Forces of the Armed Forces of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. The Russian military commissars then wrote that the purpose of the offensive was precisely the distraction of Ukrainian reserves from the main direction of the impact of the RF Armed Forces in the Center of Donbass. It is already possible, already in May it developed its operation with a blow across the border and the Ukrainian command. On August 6, the invasion began-and at first it took place successfully: the Armed Forces of Ukraine were able to enter the territory of Russia for 20-30 kilometers and occupy the Sudzha district center. The APU command achieved operational surprise, convincingly justifying the concentration of troops at the border with the need to strengthen defense in case of a new offensive of the RF Armed Forces on Sumy. The main forces for the operation were transferred at the last moment before its beginning. The need for the invasion was substantiated by Kiev purely military considerations. The version of the operation for the defense of the Sumy region and the cessation of shelling of the city of Sumy (it is also the “creation of the buffer zone”) was quickly forgotten. Blows on the sums only intensified. But the main thing was the idea of ​​distracting Russian troops from the direction of the main blow of the RF Armed Forces in the summer offensive in the south and in the center of Donbass. However, the Russian command by that time had large reserves in different areas. From the front around Donetsk, only one compound was transferred to the Kursk region-the 155th brigade of the Marine Corps of the Pacific Fleet. Before that, she acted in the area of ​​Ugled. True, the transfer of the brigade began before the APU invasion to the Kursk region; The initial place of purpose of this maneuver is unknown. So or otherwise, Ugledar was captured by the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation and without the participation of the 155th brigade. The rest of the “donors” became more calm directions for the creation of the Kursk group: the bulk of the forces was transferred from Kharkov and Volchansk; The other is from the line of the Dnieper in the Kherson region. From the north of Bakhmut, the 106th airborne division was removed from the front. The VSU was also assembled to continue the offensive in the Kursk region with a total number of about 15 brigades, including from among the most combat-ready ones. It is interesting that the 47th mechanized brigade, in the service of which were ABRAMS tanks and BMP Bradley, sent under Sudzhu from the front line south of Pokrovsk in the central part of Donbass. VSU could not develop the offensive deep into the Kursk region. After the Ukrainian army failed to occupy the Korenevo district center and break through to the Rylsk -Legs in the Russian rear, she had to go to defense. Then Kyiv gave new justifications to continue the operation – this time purely political. The main thing was the desire to exchange territories in the Kursk region officially voiced by Vladimir Zelensky for some of the Ukrainian regions occupied by Russia. In this sense, Ukraine suffered an unconditional defeat. Now she (and that, probably temporarily) controls the bridgehead half as much as the territory captured by the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation under only Volchansky. The output of the podcast “What happened” about Kursk is fighting to say that Ukraine received a respite due to the attack on the attack? What would happen if the RF Armed Forces sent reserves to the Donbass? Last year’s plans for the Russian command regarding the use of these reserves are unknown. Perhaps the Armed Forces, having started an attack on Kursk, really disrupted some important operation of the RF Armed Forces. One as a whole, the decision to send large forces to the Ukrainian army to the passive section of the front (and after leaving them there after the start of the counter-offensive of the RF Armed Forces in October 2024) influenced the situation on the fronts negatively. At the decisive moment of the Russian offensive in the south of the Donbass, the APU command did not have reserves. As a result, the “fortresses” of Ugledar, Kurakhovo and the Great Novoselka were lost, as well as the extensive territory between the western outskirts of Donetsk and the Pokrovsk line – the Great Novoselka with dozens of settlements. Russian troops advanced in auxiliary directions: they entered the western outskirts of Pokrovsk and to the border of the Dnieperpetrovsk region; Fortinated the River Oskol at Kupyansk; They occupied part of the “fortresses” of the Toretsk and the clock north of Donetsk. Now all these territorial losses are not compensated by acquisitions in the Kursk region. The account of successful breakthroughs of summer and autumn Russian troops remain the initiative in the south of Donbass. Only by February 2025, the Armed Forces managed to collect strength in order to stop the offensive of the RF Armed Forces on the Pokrovsk -Toretsk line with counterattacks. But the Russian army completes the regrouping of forces from the southern part of the front to Pokrovsk and Toretsk and can soon resume this offensive. VSU will be difficult to effectively use the unit that has been released after the defeat near Sudzha. Firstly, they suffered heavy losses-especially at the last stage of a poorly organized retreat. Secondly, there was a threat of continuing the offensive of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation already in the Sumy region (it is not known whether they will take advantage of it; Putin publicly called on the Russian command “to think about creating a buffer zone in the Sumy region”, but this may also be an element of the game for deceiving the enemy). There are reserves that formally deduced from the Front to participate in the Battle of Kursk, but did not accept the noticeable in it. participation. So, from the Kherson region, the 76th airborne division was transferred to the border, however, its units did not take part in the attack on Suzh. Thus, the Russian army owns the initiative, has reserves and can choose the place of the next blow. As a result of the Kursk operation, the line of the active front was lengthened, which in itself works against the Armed Forces of Ukraine, which suffer from the shortage of personnel and the compounds ready for battle; Their opponent extensions of the front is easier, because it has a numerical advantage. The department is “analysis” (Tagstotranslate) News

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